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SUMMARY 
 
This report examines rural development and the restructuring of the defence estate.  
It looks at the issues raised for rural areas in Britain by defence restructuring, 
particularly the conversion of former military bases.  The intention of the research 
was to undertake preliminary investigation into an under-explored area for rural 
studies, to highlight the principal factors affecting the conversion of former 
military sites in rural areas, and to suggest areas for further research.  The report 
examines the economic and social effects of base closure; the factors affecting base 
re-use, including location, previous use and the role of the former landowner; the 
scope and limits of the land use planning process; and the role of rural 
development policy and funding mechanisms.  The report concludes by suggesting 
that base conversion is better conceptualised within frameworks suggested by 
literature on the political economy of uneven development than with reference to 
the notion of a ‘peace dividend’.  It also suggests areas for policy development and 
for future empirical research.   
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PART I RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
This report documents the findings of research into the implications for rural areas 
of the restructuring of the British defence estate.  In this section, I introduce the 
defence estate and discuss why its study is relevant to rural development issues.  I 
also discuss the methodology behind the research.   
 
Britain’s defence estate includes all the land, buildings and infrastructure owned 
and used by the armed forces for defence-related activities.  The most recent 
investigation of the defence estate, conducted by the House of Commons Defence 
Committee (HCDC) in 1994, put the amount of land owned by the Ministry of 
Defence (MoD) at about 227,000 hectares, with leases on another 16,000 hectares 
(HCDC, 1994a, p.vii).  The majority of this land (66.1%) is used for training.  
Other uses include airfields (11.6%), research establishments (9.1%), barracks and 
camps (4.5%), storage and supply depots (4.5%) and telecommunications stations 
(2.5%).  The defence estate has a predominantly rural location because of the space 
requirements of the activities carried out upon it.   
 
The defence estate is interesting in rural development terms for two reasons.  First, 
the armed forces in Britain (as elsewhere) have, since 1990, been involved in a 
programme of restructuring first signalled with the announcement of the Options 
for Change review in 1990 (MoD, 1991).  This restructuring is usually explained 
with reference to the collapse of the Soviet Bloc and a re-orientation in defence 
policy. It has entailed a significant reduction (up to 30%) in the number of armed 
forces personnel.  When this restructuring programme was initiated, many 
commentators expected the release of significant quantities of land from military 
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uses, with many social and economic development implications for rural areas (see 
Woodward, 1996). 
 
Many commentators talk of defence restructuring as a process of conversion, 
which includes the reallocation of financial resources, the reorientation of Research 
and Development, the restructuring of industry, demobilisation, base closure and 
redevelopment, and the scrapping of surplus weapons (BICC, 1996, p.19).  The 
various aspects of conversion have received different levels of attention by 
researchers in the UK.  Much research has assessed the conversion or 
diversification of the defence industry.  In addition, there is growing appreciation 
the environmental costs and benefits of changes in military land use.  Base closure 
and redevelopment involving the release of lands and the implications for social 
and economic development in rural areas has received less attention in Britain, and 
it is base closures that constitute the focus of this research report.   
 
The lack of critical attention may well be explained by the small scale of base 
closures, relative to the size of the defence estate overall.  The HCDC in 1994 
noted that the overall size of the defence estate had changed little over the previous 
two decades; disposals in the early 1990s had not been on a large scale, although 
there was much potential for release of unwanted lands (HCDC, 1994a, p.xviii).  
Assessments of the amount of land released  from MoD use have varied; 
Farrington (1995) put the figure at 2,069 hectares for the period 1990-1994.  The 
Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) estimate that up to 4,733 
hectares may have been transferred in the period 1990-2000. The British 
experience stands in stark contrast to that of the USA or Germany.  In the USA, by 
1995 the Commission on Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) had overseen the 
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closure of 20% of the US domestic base structure with over 500 domestic sites.  
The 60 most significant closures released some 212,291 hectares of land (BICC, 
1996, p.179).  In Germany, following the drawdown of Allied forces, some 
328,000 hectares have been released as a result of base closures (ibid.).  In the UK 
the issue is perhaps relatively insignificant. 
 
Or is it?  One reason for conducting this research was to establish whether there 
was merit in talking of defence estate restructuring as a pertinent issue for rural 
areas.  Certainly, for the local authorities affected (and as I discuss below), this is a 
critical issue.  As this research has found, whilst at a national or even regional scale 
the social and economic impacts of defence estate restructuring have been 
negligible, for the rural localities affected by it, conversion raises many problems 
and possibilities for rural social and economic development.  This is further 
complicated by questions as to whether there is empirical evidence to support the 
rhetoric of a ‘peace dividend’ or penalty—a discourse frequently drawn upon to 
explain defence estate restructuring— or whether current processes of conversion 
are better conceptualised as part of a continual process of geopolitical change since 
the end of the Second World War. 
 
The second interesting point about the restructuring of the defence estate and its 
impact on rural development  concerns the complexity of the issue.  Are the 
problems brought by base closure significantly different to those brought by more 
general processes of economic change in the countryside?  If they are different, 
what are the implications for rural development policy in affected areas, and for the 
conceptual framework with which we understand countryside change and rural 
development? 
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Many economic and social processes shape the geography and socio-economic 
structure of rural areas.  These processes include the shift from productivist to 
post-productivist agriculture, counter-urbanisation, the demise of the 
manufacturing and extractive industries and the growth of new service industries, 
new patterns of leisure activity, new forms of consumption and shifts in the 
meaning of rurality.  Rather than existing on the margins of social scientific 
investigation, rural areas are increasingly being seen as spaces in which processes 
of economic, social and political restructuring have particular outcomes, and their 
experience is critical to the understanding of change in the political economy and 
sociology of advanced capitalist economies (Marsden et al, 1993). 
 
The policy responses to processes of countryside change continue to attract 
academic interest, particularly within the context of rural development.  The study 
of rural development policy is central to the study of countryside change, because 
of the importance of policy mechanisms in shaping the outcome of processes of 
social and economic change.  Policies influencing the development trajectories of 
much of Britain include rural development programmes at European Union level 
(such as Objectives 1 and 5b, LEADER I and II), at national level with the 
designation of Rural Development Areas and other programmes associated with 
the Rural Development Commission, and with the conceptualisation of the rural 
development embodied in the 1995 Rural White Paper.  Local policy responses at 
county and district levels, the work of non-statutory bodies such as the Training 
and Enterprise Councils and others with a rural development brief are also 
important here. 
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Current processes of socio-economic change, and the raft of policy responses, in 
turn raise interesting questions for the future of areas affected by the restructuring 
of the defence estate.  Are the social, economic and political changes being brought 
to localities affected by defence estate restructuring idiosyncratic, peculiar or 
specific in some way because of a former military presence, or are they just part of 
wider processes of rural change experienced in different forms across rural Britain?  
This is an important question because of the claims made for the existence of a 
peace dividend and its impact.  It is important because of the conceptual questions 
that it raises about the relationship between the central and local state, and to which 
I return below.  It is also important because of what it implies for rural 
development policy, particularly in locating the limits to policy intervention. 
 
This research report documents the findings of preliminary research directed 
towards these two issues.  Three sets of research questions structured the empirical 
phase of the research.  The first set of questions concerned the economic and social 
impacts of defence estate restructuring in rural localities.  In places affected by the 
closure or restructuring of military bases, what were the expected economic 
impacts and actual outcomes?  What new economic activities were replacing 
defence or military-related ones?  What were the social consequences in terms of 
impact on local resident communities or the establishment of new communities, 
especially in areas where housing had been sold?  What impact does conversion 
have on community development?  The second set of questions concerned the 
policy mechanisms which have evolved to tackle both conversion and rural 
development issues.  How was the problem conceptualised, if at all, in rural 
development policies?  Which rural development policy and funding mechanisms 
were effective in shaping conversion outcomes, and which were not?  The third set 
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of questions concerned the roles played by government and other agencies at the 
local, national and European level in shaping the process of conversion.  How 
effective could were governmental and non-governmental agencies in the 
conversion process?  What roles did the voluntary sector and community-based 
organisations play?  How were partnerships established and how effective were 
they in practice? 
 
The research was intended as a wide-ranging exploration of an issue, rather than 
the more rigid testing of a single research question and the methodology chosen 
was based accordingly on the need for flexibility.  An underlying issue was that the 
focus of the research—of defence estate restructuring and the consequences for 
rural development—was itself the subject of conceptual inquiry.  In addition to the 
exploratory nature of the research, the resources available were limited, so a 
systematic survey of the experience of defence estate conversion across Britain 
would not have been possible (although as I discuss in the concluding section, this 
may now be necessary).  The methodology chosen was a qualitative one, based on 
the use of case studies of particular instances of conversion in England, 
concentrating on the counties of Lincolnshire, North Yorkshire and Norfolk. Post-
hoc rationalisations of research strategies are always tempting. The sites examined 
in Lincolnshire, as befits the ‘Home of the Royal Air Force’ were all former 
airfields.   Lincolnshire was chosen because it contained Brookenby, the winner of 
a Rural Challenge award.  Further research into bases in Lincolnshire expanded 
from that initial contact.  Catterick Garrison was examined because of its change of 
use.  Information on sites in East Anglia, also airbases, was gathered as by-product 
of a separate research project on the progress of the EU’s Objective 5b programme 
in the region (Ward and Woodward, 1998).  In each case study area, interviews 
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were conducted with representatives from district and county councils, the Defence 
Estate Organisation (Lands), local development agencies (both private and 
voluntary), the Rural Development Commission, Training and Enterprise Councils, 
and individuals at the local level with an interest in this issue.  Government and 
local authority planning and policy documentation was collected.  Supplementary 
material from other examples of base conversion was also used, drawn from 
published and unpublished academic studies, reports by local authorities and rural 
development bodies, and national and local media commentaries.   
 
The principal findings from the research are discussed in Part II, were empirical 
material is linked to current policy and academic debates on defence estate 
restructuring and base conversion in rural areas. 
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PART II RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
This section brings together the main research findings looking at the economic 
and social effects of base closure; the factors affecting the re-use potential of bases, 
which include location, past uses and the role of the MoD as landowner; scope and 
limits of the land use planning process and the role of rural development policy and 
associated funding mechanisms in facilitating conversion.     
 
The economic and social effects of base closure 
In this section, I look at the range of economic and social consequences of base 
conversion.  The term ‘base’ is used here to include a variety of facilities such as 
airfields, depots, barracks, training centres, research centres and ammunition 
dumps.  Military bases can be significant sources of economic activity and 
employment generation in rural areas which may otherwise have limited potential 
for economic activity.  In assessing the impacts of base closure, BICC distinguish 
between the direct employment of both military and civilian personnel on a base, 
contract employment consisting of the jobs created as a result of tenders put out by 
base administration, and indirect employment in terms of non-military jobs created 
by the direct employees’ purchase of goods and services (BICC, 1996, p.175).  
Current orthodoxy supposes that base conversion can lead to severe economic 
problems in the localities affected, at least in the short term: 
There will be major impacts on local economies as a result of the loss of 
civilian jobs and military personnel spending, though redevelopment 
where possible will offset this in the longer term.  (Farrington, 1995, 
p.276).   
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This is by no means a purely contemporary problem. For example, Network 
Demilitarized point to the economic consequences of the decline of employment at 
the Woolwich Arsenal in London from a peak of 80,000 in 1914 to zero in 1994 
(Network Demilitarised, 1994, p.9).   
 
The vulnerability of different localities to base conversion will of course be a 
reflection of the levels of dependency on the military sector.  A 1992 survey 
commissioned by DGXVI of the European Commission examined the dependency 
of areas (at the NUTS II level) to the defence industry, to military employment and 
to both.  Table 1 shows the UK areas with the highest proportion of the population 
employed in the defence industry and the military sector, with an indication of each 
area’s ranking overall in the European Union. 
 
Clearly, the employment offered by military activity, whether for military or 
civilian personnel, is critical to the economic viability of some areas.  Threats of 
closure generate real fears.  James Derounian quotes a study undertaken in 1989 by 
researchers at the University of East Anglia which estimated that the closure of the 
USAF bases at Woodbridge and Bentwaters in Suffolk would lead to local 
economic disaster with the loss of 7,000 annual contracts between bases and local 
companies within a 25 miles radius of the base (Derounian, 1993, p.12).  The fears 
generated by the news of the closure of RAF Scampton in Lincolnshire are a case 
in point.  The closure of this base was announced in 1994, and scheduled for 
1996/7.  A report commissioned by Lincolnshire Training and Enterprise Council 
(TEC) and others in 1994 examined the potential economic impact of the closure 
and warned of serious economic problems were the closure to proceed: 
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Table 1: Military dependence in the UK. 
 
Overall EU 
ranking 
Area % employed 
in defence 
industry 
 
% employed 
by military 
total defence 
dependency 
10 Hampshire, Isle of Wight 1.18 7.83 8.95 
11 North Yorkshire 0.00 6.25 6.25 
15 Cornwall, Devon 1.55 5.32 6.81 
21 East Anglia 
(Norfolk and Suffolk) 
 
0.18 4.34 4.51 
 
22 Avon, Gloucestershire and Wiltshire 1.26 4.25 5.48 
24 Lincolnshire 0.00 4.10 4.10 
26 Berkshire, Buckinghamshire and 
Oxfordshire 
 
0.36 3.98 4.33 
 EC average 1.10 3.72 4.82 
 
Source: CEC (1992). 
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The proposed closure of RAF Scampton is likely to have a 
particularly heavy impact upon the Lincolnshire economy.  The 
area has already suffered as a result of a series of major cuts in the 
defence sector, including the closure in recent years of 3 major 
airfields.  The cumulative effect of these earlier closures and cut 
backs has been the loss of over 3,500 jobs in the defence and 
related industrial sector since 1990.  (Coopers and Lybrand, 1994, 
p.1) 
 
The report argued that the economic structure of the local economy had 
already been seriously weakened by these closures and that the loss of RAF 
Scampton would result in an estimated loss of a further 500 jobs, comprising 
330 civilian jobs on the base, 100 off-site contract jobs and a further 70 
indirect jobs, with a reduction in Lincolnshire’s income of at least £6.5 
million per year.  In addition, the state of the local economy also signalled 
further economic decline for the area if RAF Scampton were to close: 
The problem has been further intensified by the reliance of the 
economy on traditional sectors that have limited growth potential 
and an under representation of sectors demonstrating long term 
growth opportunity.  The local economy remains weak and 
vulnerable to market down turns, its ability to withstand further 
job and income losses is limited.  (Coopers and Lybrand, 1994, 
p.1). 
 
Fears like this, and an absence of available research findings specifically on 
the experience of rural areas, prompted the Rural Development Commission 
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(RDC) to commission a survey in 1995 to establish the impacts of defence 
restructuring on local economies and communities in rural areas.  Locating 
this study squarely within the discourse of the ‘peace dividend’, the study set 
out to assess the direct and indirect impacts, especially on employment, of 
the peace dividend in rural areas, and to draw lessons from existing 
experience on tackling these impacts (EAG/ECOTEC, 1996).  The survey 
estimated 70,000 military and 25,000 civilian job losses as a consequence of 
UK armed forces restructuring plus the loss of 15,000 US personnel for the 
period 1990-1995. Case studies were conducted in six localities—Portland 
Naval Base in Dorset; RAF Sculthorpe, RAF West Raynham and RAF 
Swanton Morley in Norfolk; RN Monks Park, RN Spring Quarry, the 
Support Weapons Wing at Netheravon and the Army Vehicle Depot in 
Ludgershall, all stores bases in Wiltshire; RAF/USAF Fairford in 
Gloucestershire; RAF Swinderby in Lincolnshire; and the defence and 
aerospace industry in Pendle, Lancashire. The case studies indicated a 
variety of experience of employment decline, ranging from 380 jobs lost at 
RAF Swinderby in Lincolnshire and 3,000 at Portland in Dorset, to indirect 
job losses in the wider economy at 60 for Swinderby and 1,500 for Portland.  
There was also evidence of long-term unemployment facing those who had 
been made redundant, plus evidence for a spate of closures for related 
businesses. 
 
Severe as these employment losses might sound, the RDC report also argued 
that: 
Whilst the direct impacts of the base closures and run-downs have 
been substantial, in general it is clear that there is no 
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“employment crisis” in relation to the sites considered.  
(EAG/ECOTEC, 1996, p.i)   
 
The reasons for this included the relatively low levels of local procurement 
by the bases concerned; the fact that spending was spread over wider sub-
regional economies; the location of the bases studied in generally 
economically buoyant areas; and the fact that lost spending from military 
personnel had been replaced by population growth. The economic 
consequences of conversion were also influenced by the complex nature of 
changes in the bases over a long time period with some re-use of sites.  
These findings echo those of the CEC report, which argued that the impact 
of defence and military employment cuts would depend on the structural 
characteristics of a region: 
Certain specialised and isolated subregions may be more 
adversely affected by defence cuts as they may be deprived of the 
certain stabilizing influences which come from being part of a 
larger integrated economic region. (CEC, 1992, p.18) 
 
The report was rather complacent about the effect of base closures in rural 
areas: 
The impact of a military base in a small rural community can be 
significant as well, but in general, the data indicate that the 
number of indirect jobs generated from bases is not as large as the 
number created by defence companies.  (CEC, 1992, p.98) 
Even so, they may well make a fundamental contribution to the local 
economy.  For example, Catterick Garrison near Richmond in North 
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Yorkshire has a resident military population of 9,600 with a further 1,800 
living ‘off-camp”.  This is an area dominated by a single ‘industry’.  The 
Garrison makes a substantial contribution to the local community—the total 
income for military personnel in the area is £130 million per year (gross) 
(Richmond Partnership, 1998, p.10).  It is also a significant employer of 
local labour.  Although its future is assured—defence restructuring in this 
case meant a change of function rather than base closure—changes in MoD 
tendering policies were having a pronounced effect: 
Changes in MoD policy on centralised competitive tendering have 
meant that services to the Garrison, such as building and 
maintenance, are now more likely to won by national companies 
using their own labour than by local companies.  Employment 
prospects, economic confidence and the level of income have 
diminished.  All of this means that people don’t spend, don’t buy 
houses and don’t stay, which has a knock-on effect on local 
shops, businesses and services.  (Richmond Partnership, 1997, 
npn) 
 
Initial fears of economic collapse following base conversion may not 
necessarily be borne out in reality.  Reflecting on the closure of RAF 
Scampton four years later, one interviewee remarked that its closure had 
gone virtually unnoticed.  Economic catastrophe for the area had not 
occurred as predicted.  This remark is indicative for two reasons.  First, it 
shows the importance of emphasising a worst-case scenario.  The quotations 
above relating to RAF Scampton and Catterick Garrison were both taken 
from funding application documents.  There is often merit in emphasising a 
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point in order to make a case for funding in a competitive environment.  The 
second point concerns emotion.  Base closures provoke strong emotions, 
another reason perhaps for the prediction of economic collapse following 
conversion.  For example, the proposed closure of RAF Scampton 
precipitated the formation of a  ‘Save Our Scampton’ campaign, conducted 
mostly within the local print media, underpinned by a strong emotional 
rationale for the saving of Scampton.  Scampton had been home to the Dam 
Busters, the inventor of the Bouncing Bomb, and had played a significant 
role in the Berlin Airlift.  It was symbolically constructed as important not 
only for the economic benefits it brought, but also for the historical 
associations which made this place special and linked the locality to world 
events.  Similarly, a local news report on the delays in a decision on the 
future of RAF Watton in Norfolk was accompanied by a detailed account of 
the role played by the base in the Second World War and after, under the 
headline ‘A proud history of sacrifice and top-secret endeavour’ (Eastern 
Daily Press, 29.11.97).  Similarly, in debates about alterations to the use of 
the Otterburn Training Area in Northumberland, many local people endorsed 
the MoD’s developments on the (erroneous) grounds that they would boost a 
local economy that was otherwise lacking in employment opportunities.  The 
experience on Tyneside’s shipyards and Durham’s coalfields which 
indicated what economic decline could do to an area, gave an emotional 
boost to these claims (Woodward, 1998). 
 
We should not be dismissive of the fears of those opposing the closure of 
facilities such as RAF Scampton.  Such fears are genuinely held, even if they 
are often not realised.  But it is useful to remember two points about such 
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opposition.  One comes from a local interviewee, who was highly critical 
that such a campaign had been conducted, because of the energy dissipated 
by such activity. For this individual, it was surely better to put time and 
effort into the development of alternative solutions, than to defend the status 
quo.  A second point is made by Barney Warf in his study of the geopolitics 
and geoeconomics of US base closures.  ‘Local opposition to base closures 
is misguided’, he says; ‘the available evidence indicates that the long-run 
benefits outweigh short-run losses in economic activity’ (Warf, 1997, 
p.542).  As Farrington pointed out in the quotation at the beginning of this 
section, redevelopment and re-use will probably offset economic problems 
in the longer term.  Many of those interviewed as part of this research 
recognised this too, and the remainder of this paper discusses the factors 
affecting re-use and the strategies deployed to maximise the economic and 
social potential of former bases.   
 
Before going on to this, it is necessary to make a point about the focus of 
most studies of base conversion.  In assessing the consequences of 
conversion, the analysts cited above have focused almost entirely on the 
economic consequences. The ‘peace dividend’ is usually equated with a 
financial payout.  Yet there are also social impacts to consider.  These were 
summarised to the HCDC as including the impact on local school rolls and 
school viability; a reduced demand for off-base rented housing; the impact 
of the removal of a section of the local community on such things as sports, 
art and leisure clubs and facilities; cultural loss; and a possible loss of local 
sports, leisure and cultural facilities (HCDC, 1994b, p.129).  Interviewees in 
this study found similar social impacts in places affected by base closure.  
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For example, the closure of RAF Swinderby was thought to have threatened 
the future of the primary school in the nearby village of Swinderby because 
of the reduction in the number of young children in the area after the 
departure of the RAF.  There is very little precise information available on 
the social consequences of base closure, and this is certainly an area for 
further research. 
 
Factors affecting the conversion of bases in rural areas 
In this section I examine some of the factors that influence the development 
of former military bases, in terms of their location, their previous use and the 
effect this has on development plans, and the role of the (former) owner, the 
MoD.  This neither a sophisticated framework for the discussion of these 
issues, given the considerable overlaps between them, and nor is it an 
exhaustive list by any means.  The factors discussed here are those most 
apparent during this research.  As Network Demilitarised (1994, 1996) note, 
there are many others. 
 
Location 
It is an obvious point, but the location of redundant bases is probably the 
most important factor in determining the effects of base closure, the 
formulation of development plans and their ultimate success or failure.  As 
one interviewee put it, ‘What are the three rules of property development? 
Location, location, location.’  It is also the one factor no policy initiative or 
development strategy can do anything about. 
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Location was a factor mentioned by all interviewees in discussing the effects 
of base closure and the potential for new uses.  For the former RAF 
Bentwaters, its location in an Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB) 
in a remote part in rural Suffolk Coastal District far from main road and rail 
connections had presented real problems in terms of finding alternative uses 
for the site.  The base had closed in September 1993 following the 
withdrawal of USAF personnel.  A Planning Brief produced by the District 
Council stated that 
...the redevelopment should achieve a community; realise 
employment opportunities; and create a high quality environment, 
whilst respecting the location, environmental constraints and 
policy implications. (quoted in Wills, 1995, p.23) 
 
These are laudable aims.  Yet three schemes suggested by three successive 
potential purchasers were felt by one interviewee to fall far short of these 
aims, because of where Bentwaters was situated.  These included a retreat 
for the Maharishi Foundation, a business airport and a business park. ‘You 
can look at Bentwaters on the map and chuckle, really’.  Similar problems 
were reported for the former RAF bases at Sculthorpe and West Raynham, 
both in North Norfolk District, both isolated sites with very limited 
connections to the main road network.   
 
Interviewees in Lincolnshire, Norfolk and Suffolk, when discussing the 
potential future uses of bases in their localities, all said the same thing: 
‘We’re not talking RAF Alconbury here’.  RAF Alconbury, it seems, had 
attained almost mythical status amongst planners and economic development 
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officers as a redundant base in a prime location just off the A1 in 
Cambridgeshire.  A proposal was emerging at the time this research was 
being conducted for a combined civilian airport, road and rail freight 
terminal, delivering a possible 7,000 jobs.  The spin-offs in terms of the 
further economic and social benefits to this rural area were eyed enviously.  
Yet the development proposals for Alconbury have led to problems of their 
own, with local protests about the damage to the natural environment 
through the pollution and noise caused by freight usage, with knock-on 
effects on house prices and environmental amenity (Harper, 1997).  Even so, 
for local authority officers dealing with the redevelopment of bases in more 
remote rural areas, the problems of the contested countryside were easily 
preferable to those of inaccessible rural areas.   
 
An additional facet to the location issue, also emphasised by interviewees, 
was the possibility or otherwise of matching the needs of an area to the need 
to reuse a redundant base.  For example, an application was submitted to 
North Norfolk District Council for a proposed development on the site of the 
former RAF Sculthorpe base.  The project included a youth foyer or atelier 
scheme to provide housing, workshop space and training for young people.  
One councillor commented that in principle this was a good idea for the site 
(‘I thought this was a marvellous and innovative idea when I first saw the 
proposals.  There is a need to consider what we will do with these old 
airfields.’ Eastern Daily Press, 8.11.97).  For a local authority officer the 
location of Sculthorpe, 6 miles from the nearest market town of Fakenham, 
was thought to render this type of venture entirely inappropriate.  The 
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location of a redundant site relative to the growth centres and infrastructure 
in a locality is also an important feature.   
 
Interviewees generally agreed that the most appropriate schemes were those 
where local needs could be met in the location without compromising 
environmental quality.  For example, the proposal to build or refurbish up to 
1,000 houses on the site of the former RAF Swinderby was generally 
endorsed. Situated on the A46 between Lincoln and Newark, in an area with 
an identified demand for housing, the location was ideal.  The Development 
Brief opens with a glowing testimony to the potential offered by the site’s 
location: 
The former RAF Swinderby offers an outstanding opportunity to 
provide distinctive homes and work space in an established rural 
setting, building on and using the existing significant investment 
made in the site.  These qualities are combined with the further 
advantage of excellent direct road links, to the west via the A46 
and A1 to the national motorway network, and to the east into the 
whole of Eastern England and its vital east coast ports.  (North 
Kesteven District Council, 1994, p.1) 
 
Similarly, the proposals put forward for the regeneration of the housing and 
technical park (hangars and other buildings) at Brookenby in Lincolnshire 
(formerly RAF Binbrook which closed in 1987) involved both economic and 
community development initiatives which were thought to be ideal for this 
isolated, remote area with poor transport links.  Whatever other problems 
might have ensued at Brookenby (see below), the concept was considered an 
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appropriate one, given the site’s location.  At Catterick Garrison in North 
Yorkshire, a change of use at the base had freed up sites for redevelopment.  
The economic and social structure of the area dictated certain local needs, 
particular for employment and skills training, and a bid to the Single 
Regeneration Budget appeared to have maximised the potential for matching 
needs to location. 
 
One argument that sometimes appears in debates about the potential use for 
former military sites is that if location problems are so severe, perhaps the 
best strategy would simply be the removal of any remaining physical 
infrastructure and the restoration to agriculture or something approaching the 
natural environment on the site.  For example, the Council for the Protection 
of Rural England (CPRE) local branch argued with reference to the former 
RAF Binbrook : 
It’s isolated location and designation [as AONB] make it 
inappropriate for further development and MoD’s attempts to sell 
some of the hundreds of houses have not been a success.  [...]   In 
CPRE’s view the site should be dismantled and returned to 
agriculture.  (HCDC, 1994b, p.164) 
 
As Sarah Wills has argued, re-use by restoration to a site’s natural state may 
be environmentally valuable, but would be of little economic benefit to the 
MoD or the local economy (Wills, 1995). The 1995 Rural White paper noted 
that the closure of defence establishments in rural areas could create 
substantial local problems, but signalled a Government commitment to 
maximising the potential of redundant facilities for suitable employment and 
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wealth creation (DoE, 1995).  This is a dilemma for many rural areas 
affected by defence restructuring.  Their high environmental quality is 
valued, yet cannot take precedence over local social and economic needs, 
particularly as the existence of physical infrastructure may be essential in 
enabling future economic activity.  Planning policies may otherwise be too 
restrictive in prohibiting development in open countryside, and where 
existing facilities may be re-used to bring much-needed employment and 
facilities, a return to agricultural use may result in the loss of opportunity for 
economic activity.  This is also a regional development issue.  The return of 
the airfield and hangars at RAF Binbrook to agriculture, for example, may 
mean missed opportunities for economic development in a region struggling 
with high levels of rural unemployment and low levels of services.  In rural 
Berkshire, a boom area in the 1980s, it may be easier to afford the 
restoration of Greenham Common to open countryside, as proposed by the 
local authority (Newbury District Council, 1996).  The location of a site 
within a regional economy is an important consideration.   
 
The past dictates the future 
A second factor influencing the development of former military bases in 
rural areas is its past use.  Again, this is an obvious point, but it merits 
examination because of the issues it raises.  A base’s former function 
dictates by and large the possibilities for its future use. 
 
The diversity of types of property and their uses was emphasised by the 
House of Commons Defence Committee, which talked of the ‘infinitely 
varied and complex’ nature of the defence estate.  This diversity is 
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maintained in the sites that have, or are being, released from military 
activity.  Some are extremely well-known, such as the former Royal Naval 
base at Rosyth, with 72 hectares, and buildings with a floor space of 304,800 
sq. metres, or the airfield and aerodrome at Farnborough, home to the 
biennial air show, and now leased to a private company.  Others are small 
and unknown, such as the small radio stations that litter the Lincolnshire 
countryside.  This research did not attempt to assess the redevelopment 
consequences of sites classified according to type (and again, this might be 
an area for further research).  Rather, the intention was to uncover the 
diversity of issues that former site function suggests.  Airfields, by default, 
were the main site type under study. 
 
The range of potential uses mentioned for any of the sites in this report were 
enormous.  Take, for example, the case of RAF Scampton, covering 360 
hectares.  This airbase was opened in July 1917, closed in 1920 and then re-
opened in August 1936.  Its phased closure was announced as part of the 
Front Line First initiative; the Red Arrows (the RAF aerial acrobatic team) 
would relocate to nearby RAF Cranwell, but with the retention of the 
runway and associated facilities for emergency landing.  The housing and 
related facilities were to be retained by the MoD for use by personnel 
stationed at RAF Waddington, the other side of Lincoln.  The major 
technical, office and hangar areas were closed in June 1996.  This latter part 
is available for development and comprises offices, hangars, workshops, 
training facilities, health and leisure buildings and some accommodation, 
with a total floorspace of 80,000 metres available.  The buildings date from 
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the 1940s and 1960s and vary widely in condition.  The Development Brief 
sounds a warning at this point: 
Few of the buildings are modern and a number appear in urgent 
need of major repair or demolition.  The condition of almost all 
the buildings and the appearance of the area generally, will 
deteriorate rapidly, unless active uses are found for them in the 
near future.  (West Lindsey District Council, 1996, p.10). 
 
The Brief then goes on to list an exhaustive range of possible re-uses for the 
site: 
It is anticipated that interest could be attracted for a variety of B1, 
B2, B8 (including open storage), leisure and community uses 
including offices; joinery, mechanical, light industrial and 
research and development workshops; storage and distribution 
uses (including open car storage); film studio; leisure centre; child 
care centre; nightclub; bowling alley; go-kart racing (indoor and 
outdoor); Sunday market; land yachting; model aircraft flying; 
light aviation uses; driver training facilities and recycling 
facilities, to name but a few.  (West Lindsey District Council, 
1996, p.12) 
 
An extremely up-beat regeneration proposal, produced by a group of public 
and private sector interests under the umbrella of ‘The Scampton 
Partnership’, narrowed the range of suggestions down somewhat.  The range 
of potential lands uses included sites for new industrial and commercial 
units; the creation and management of a commercial and technology park; 
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the development of new housing and student accommodation; the re-use of 
existing recreational facilities; the development of an industrial airport; and 
the creation of a Bomber Command Museum (Scampton Partnership, 1997).  
Current uses of old hangars and buildings at Brookenby (Binbrook 
Technical Park) include cold storage of BSE-contaminated carcasses, fish 
processing, saw mill, steam train restoration, financial services company, 
machine-applied coatings, fork lift truck driver training company. 
 
A big problem for all the sites considered in this study was the inadequacy of 
the existing infrastructure bequeathed by the MoD.  This was a persistent 
and often costly problem, shaping the pace and scope of redevelopment 
plans. The House of Commons Defence Committee commented on the 
particular problems arising from poor standards of infrastructure (HCDC, 
1994a, p.xxiii).  They noted that existing infrastructure was mostly 
constructed outside the authority of the then statutory undertakers, to the 
prevailing standards of the day.  It would now only be adopted by local 
authorities and utility companies if it was brought up to the current standards 
adhered to by these bodies.  This would often involve considerable costs, to 
be borne either by a prospective developer or by MoD prior to disposal.  The 
Committee noted, for example, that an infrastructure appraisal at RAF 
Bentwaters in Suffolk suggested that millions of pounds of expenditure 
would be necessary to bring infrastructure up to adoptable standards, with a 
new pumping station and new water and gas supplies for the whole area.    
Another good example of the problems caused by the inadequacies of 
existing infrastructure is the situation at the former RAF Swinderby.  This 
base was used by the School of Recruit Training and later the Elementary 
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Flying Training Squadron until its closure in 1993 (for further details about 
its military past, see Hancock, 1985).  The entire site covers 251 hectares, 60 
hectares of which contain a technical site (hangars and maintenance sheds), 
former barracks and training blocks and some residential accommodation.  
The rest of the site is covered by the old airfield.  The original purchasers of 
the site sold the airfield to an aggregates company and the technical park to a 
development company, leaving an area for housing development.  
Swinderby occupies a good location, and the housing and employment-
generating activities proposed for the site were generally endorsed.  
However, the condition of the existing infrastructure was a big issue in 
shaping the progress of any future development.  The site developers for the 
portion of the site scheduled for housing development were obliged to 
provide key infrastructure (a highway junction, gas, water, sewerage and  
electricity) before selling plots of land to individual housebuilders.  One 
interviewee commented that the site purchasers would be willing to do this if 
the funds raised from the sale of plots to housebuilders was going to be 
sufficient to recoup the initial investment in the site.  This then raises the 
questions of the type of development that is enabled.   
 
The cost of infrastructure upgrading was a problem on all of the sites 
included in this research.  The House of Commons Defence Committee 
estimated a cost of £2.5 million to bring sewerage works alone up to 
standard at RAF Scampton.   Interviewees pointed to this as a significant 
block in future development proposals for RAF Sculthorpe.  This was huge 
issue at Brookenby.  As a winner of Rural Challenge in Round 1 of the Rural 
Development Commission scheme, great hopes were raised as to the 
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potential for innovative economic and social development projects on the 
site.  Frustrations were tangible in interviews with those involved in the 
project at the amount of funding (and sheer effort) that had been expended in 
getting the infrastructure of the site up to adoptable standard, a prerequisite 
for further developments.  For example, housing on the site had been sold at 
good prices, yet because at the time of the majority of housing sales the 
basic services had not been adopted, new residents were having the pay 
heavily to maintain basic services—up to £200 in some cases. A further 
quarter of a million pounds had to be spent to upgrade the roads and enable 
the local authority to adopt them and remove this financial burden from local 
residents, removing money which could have been invested in the technical 
park. 
 
The transfer of housing stock from MoD to private ownership, a feature of 
several of the bases under consideration here, obviously has a considerable 
impact on future development prospects.  The existence of housing estates in 
otherwise sparsely populated rural areas made bases more attractive as 
centres for economic activity.  Housing transfers also created new 
communities, shaping community and social development in the areas 
concerned.  At Brookenby, the disposal of the site had released a large 
number of former MoD houses onto the market.  Some 200 properties were 
sold to a single purchaser, who then re-sold the properties, with about 120 
being sold to private owners and about 80 to a private landlord for rental.  In 
effect, a new community was created.  This created its own opportunities 
and challenges.  This was a place which, in the words of one interviewee, 
‘started with the advantage of having no history’.  Even the names changed, 
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with the new residents choosing to call their new village Brookenby 
(similarly RAF Swinderby will become Thurlby St. Hughes, and RAF 
Rissington in Gloucestershire will become Upper Rissington).   
 
The difficulties that had followed the creation of this new community were 
stressed by a number of interviewees, not as a criticism of the people that 
lived there, but rather to highlight the difficulties presented for the economic 
regeneration of bases where this had been poorly planned and poorly 
managed by new site owners.  Housing on the site had been sold in 1990-91 
at relatively low cost: 
[...]  the typical Brookenby resident is somebody who was shaken 
out of manufacturing industry in the early nineties, had a 
redundancy payment in their back pocket and used that to buy a 
house there.  And while a lot of the people there come from the 
North Midlands, there are people from the South West, Scotland 
and Ulster, and it became known there was cheap housing there 
on a reasonably pleasant site.  (Interview with development 
worker, Lincolnshire, February 1998)   
 
As we have already seen, the poor condition of the infrastructure had placed 
a financial burden on the new residents.  There were additional problems: 
It also created a situation where a number of people who bought 
into the rural idyll without any real realisation of the drawbacks of 
living in an area like this.  It is very remote, you do need to be 
able to drive a car, for example.  If your partner is taking the car 
off for the day to take them for work, then you might be stuck 
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back at home with no transport.  Although there’s a school 
nearby, there’s a doctor’s surgery nearby down in [the village of] 
Binbrook itself, typical of all these RAF bases in my view [...] is 
the kind of isolation that we’re experiencing here in Brookenby.  
(Interview with development worker, Lincolnshire, February 
1998) 
 
Furthermore: 
...one of the major problems this village does have, on a social 
level, is there is an area of housing right in the middle of the 
village [...] which was bought up by a property development 
company based in Grimsby and that company puts its ‘difficult to 
house’ families there [...] so if you’ve got a potential tenant 
coming along who’s claiming benefit, potentially housing benefit 
and all the rest of it, they would tend to be steered towards 
Brookenby rather than towards any other properties.  So what 
we’ve got in the middle of the village is a group or a small 
community there, and many don’t have any of the resources that 
even people living in other parts of the village have.  Maybe they 
don’t have access to a car.  They don’t know what its like to live 
outside an urban environment, not be able to walk down the pub, 
not to be able to go to the cinema and there’s a drugs problem.  
And also, because that housing is so cheap to rent, if people are 
having problems, say in Barnsley, with the authorities, they can 
just up stumps and come and live in Brookenby for a bit until the 
heat dies down.  [...] if you look at it, it looks like a run down 
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inner city housing estate—litter, dogs, abandoned cars, untidy 
gardens, the lot—and its a problem for everybody.  (Interview 
with development worker, Lincolnshire, February 1998) 
 
Indeed, the image of Brookenby was conjured up in debates on 
redevelopment schemes in other former bases.  For a number of 
interviewees, if Alconbury was thought to embody all the benefits of 
conversion, Brookenby constituted one of the worst examples.  For example, 
in arguing for Single Regeneration Budget funding, the Scampton 
Partnership drew on the example of Brookenby to illustrate the potential 
problems associated with conversion: 
As the units were sold at low prices purchasers were attracted 
from far afield and therefore had few social contacts in the local 
area.  The problems created have ranged from frequent violent 
incidents, crime, vandalism, family breakdown and 
unemployment.  (Scampton Partnership, 1996, p.27) 
 
Poor planing the re-use of surplus MoD property was identified as the root 
cause of many problems.  The sale of vacant housing was not in itself a 
problem, and interviewees dealing in a professional capacity with the re-use 
of former MoD housing, at Brookenby and elsewhere, were quick to stress 
that people who had moved into this housing were responsible for the 
creation of vibrant new communities in places which otherwise would have 
lain derelict.  Housing re-use brings life to an area.  For example, at RAF 
Sculthorpe, two estates of housing had been sold to individual buyers, 
comprising Blenheim Park with 100 houses and Wicken Green with 210 
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bungalows.  Commenting on the large rise in the prices of these houses, the 
local press spoke glowingly about the ‘success story of Wicken Green, 
Norfolk’s newest village’ (Eastern Daily Press, 19.7.97).  Development 
workers at Brookenby were full of praise for the way in which a new 
community had pulled together and created a sense of community spirit, 
through communal events (and eventually a Rural Challenge bid, of which 
more later). 
 
The final issue worth mentioning in this discussion of former uses and their 
effects on future site use, is that of site contamination.  This appears to be an 
issue for most former MoD lands, however small.  For example, although the 
Development Brief for RAF Scampton recommended further investigation, 
any contamination from fuel spillages was anticipated as minor.  As the 
HCDC inquiry into the defence estate noted, contamination is almost 
inevitable on the defence estate, given ‘the range of materials historically 
used or stored by the Armed Forces, and the very much lower standard of 
care in earlier times’ (HCDC, 1994a, p.xxiv).  They called for more explicit 
documentation of the extent and nature of contamination on MoD sites.  In 
some areas which are no longer used by the military, this contamination is a 
pressing problem.  For example, the contamination of Holy Loch in 
Scotland, which had been used by the US Navy submarine fleet, was 
described graphically on one report: 
The three mile stretch of water near the holiday town of Dunoon, 
which once hosted the most powerful concentration of nuclear 
weapons in western Europe, is now described by environmental 
campaigners as one of Europe’s filthiest stretches of water, with 
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high concentrations of toxic chemicals and a seabed littered with 
130,000 cubic metres of debris thrown overboard by the US fleet.  
The junk includes sunken barges, 60 drums filled with an 
unidentified substance, nine shipwrecks, filing cabinets, 
scaffolding, ropes, breeze blocks and six washing machines.  
(Donegan, 1997). 
 
A row appeared to be unfolding as to whether the toxic materials were best 
left in situ, or cleared from the site.  For some sites, clearance is the only 
option.  A recent television programme found evidence for the existence of 
buried dumps of mustard gas at the former RAF Norton Disney, near 
Swinderby, requiring disposal by the RAF (Home Ground, BBC North, 4th 
June 1998).   
 
The role of the former landowner 
A third set of factors raised by interviewees as affecting the re-use of former 
military sites was the role of the former landowner, the Ministry of Defence, 
in relation to current legal requirements on the sale of surplus MoD sites, 
uncertainty over disposals, and the lack of adequate information on the 
progress of disposals. 
A significant problem in the conversion of military bases are the legal and 
financial rules governing the disposal of surplus MoD sites.  The Treasury 
Rules, set out in 1988 guidelines DAO 4/88 and revised in July 1992, require 
the MoD to obtain the best possible price on a sale.  This was roundly 
criticised in evidence to the HCDC inquiry, which concluded that the search 
for capital receipts did not in every case secure for the community the best 
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long term return.  Interviewees endorsed this with reference to the sale of 
RAF Binbrook, thought to have been sold to the highest bidder with no 
consideration of the purchasers plans (or otherwise) for the site.  The 
problems that had followed from this sale had been immense.  Treasury rules 
also require surplus land to be disposed of within three years of being so 
identified.   The HCDC in considering the matter recommended faster 
decisions on the release of land and a more measured process of actual 
disposal (HCDC, 1994a, p.xxi).  Uncertainty over the MoD’s plans for a site 
was a major issue for most of the sites concerned, and one highlighted by the 
HCDC inquiry into the defence estate: 
Management of the defence estate is affected to an unusual degree 
by the aura of unpredictability hanging over all defence 
management at a time of contraction and restructuring, constant 
reviews and uncertain prospects, aggravated by the prospects for 
market testing.  Many of the individual sites on which we took 
evidence are affected in this way: and even those apparently 
cleared for disposal may be reprieved as a knock-on result of 
other decisions, to add-back forces or repatriate them from 
Germany.  (HCDC, 1994a, p.viii) 
A good example of the effect of uncertainty in shaping redevelopment of 
redundant sites comes from RAF Scampton, formerly used by the RAF 
acrobatic team, the Red Arrows.  The team was relocated to RAF Cranwell, 
but at the time the Planning Brief was drawn up, it was envisaged that the 
runway and associated land would be retained as an emergency landing 
facility who would continue their flying training over the base until 1998 
(West Lindsey District Council, 1996).  At the time interviews were 
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conducted in Lincolnshire, there was still uncertainty as to future military 
requirements for Scampton and as to the date any decision on this would be 
taken.  This was thought to hamper the progress on the formulation of 
development plans considerably. 
 
Lack of information on the progress of site sales was another problem, with 
much criticism being made of the MoD.  Individuals were not to blame, but 
rather the structure and bureaucracy of the decision-making process, within a 
hierarchical organisation, where information flows were also thought to be 
hampered by vertical segregation between departments.  Complaints of 
uncertainty in the progress of sales were common.  In the words of one local 
authority officer: 
We tried to agree a planning brief with the Ministry of Defence, 
but our planners weren’t able to reach agreement over the content 
of that document.  The site was put up for sale.  For a long time 
we didn’t know what part of the site the MoD was going to sell 
off.  (Interview with local authority officer, Norfolk, November 
1997) 
 
Another complained that:  
...in the sales process the local authority is completely in the dark 
and we were not sure who was being sold the land [...]  we’re 
usually the last to know.  Which makes it quite difficult for 
planning purposes.  (Interview with local authority officer, 
Lincolnshire, February 1998). 
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Similar frustrations were vented in the Eastern Daily Press by two parish 
councillors losing patience at the lack of any definitive statement on the 
future of RAF West Raynham, near Fakenham in Norfolk: 
‘We do not seem to be able to get any information.  We can shout 
and stamp our feet but it does not make any difference.’ 
‘Approaches have been made to get some sort of development 
brief for West Raynham but it is always met with what is, quite 
frankly, almost a rebuff.  It is a shame that very well-built houses 
are apparently standing empty with no use made of them.’  
(Quoted in the Eastern Daily Press, 15.12.97) 
 
Uncertainty and lack of information on the progress of disposals was also 
compounded for some local authority officers by the problem of now 
knowing to whom within the Defence Estate Organisation inquiries should 
be addressed.  For one interviewee, the rationalisation of the management of 
the defence estate within the Defence Estate Organisation, established in 
March 1997, had only served to compound these problems.  Also, there 
appeared to be a lack of data available on changes within the defence estate.  
Certainly, the research reported here found that no accessible (i.e. 
computerised) records exist of changes in defence estate holdings in 
Lincolnshire, so there was no possibility of accurately assessing year-on-
year changes.   
 
In view of criticisms, perhaps, the MoD formed a Regional Policy Unit in 
1995 to facilitate inter-departmental and regional communications about 
defence estate restructuring issues (though no interviewee raised mentioned 
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this unit in interview).  The 1995 Rural White Paper also stressed a number 
of measures which committed the MoD to improve links with Government 
Regional Offices in the development of plans for redundant sites, through 
the implementation of guidelines for joint working.  These were agreed in 
September 1996 and further modified in December 1997.  These also 
commit disposal proposals to take account of the development planning 
framework, and to this I now turn.   
 
The scope and limits of the land use planning process 
In this section, I look at the role of the land use planning system in shaping 
the redevelopment trajectory of disused sites.  The land use planning system 
is important to conversion because the current system of disposal on the 
open market gives local planning authority a peculiar role as the only 
statutory body with a duty to try and shape development plans according to 
local needs and priorities.  Also important here are central Government 
statements on conversion.  
 
Government guidance on conversion is set out in the 1995 Rural White 
Paper which established a commitment to using redundant MoD land for 
economic regeneration and the creation of employment opportunities: 
We are committed to maximising the potential of redundant 
facilities for suitable employment and wealth creation.  A range of 
regeneration programmes is available to help breathe new life into 
areas adversely affected by defence closures.  We will ensure that 
decisions on disposal and re-use take account of policies for 
regeneration and land use for the local area.  Development plans 
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should also take account of the potential of defence facilities.  We 
are committed to making the best use of land which has already 
been developed, in order to reduce the need to build on greenfield 
sites.  (DoE, 1995, p.58) 
 
Also important are Planning Policy Guidance notes which give additional 
guidance on planning policy on an area and a topic basis.  Regional Planning 
Guidance for the East Midlands states that exceptionally there may be a case 
for the re-use of derelict land such as abandoned buildings, which are 
outside the framework of existing settlements, where such development is 
consistent with the need to conserve landscape and natural environment, and 
where there are no overriding objections such as increases in traffic levels.  
It states that redundant military sites might have potential for new 
settlements where there is good accessibility, but that the existence of a 
potential site should not be regarded as a reason in itself for the 
establishment of any new settlement.  It goes on to raise the issue of 
sustainability and emphasises the need for the local provision of essential 
services in new developments, to ensure this.  
 
The development plan framework set out in Structure and Local Plans is 
critical.  A handbook on the conversion of military sites, produced by 
Network Demilitarised, puts this most succinctly: 
Planning policy has a significant effect on the development 
opportunities offered by redundant sites.  For many authorities 
this is one of the most difficult issues to tackle as it can often lead 
to confrontational situations and create tension on the Working 
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Group.  Issues such as remoteness, change of use, environmental 
impact and scale of development are central to the reuse process.  
In addition the policy objectives and desires to recycle land adds 
weight to the sustainability viewpoint.  The sudden windfall of a 
major land allocation, perhaps not always in the desired location, 
has provided many authorities with an alternative housing or 
business site which has slowed the necessary release of greenfield 
sites or prompted a review of strategic planning policies.   
(Network Demilitarized, 1996, p.4). 
 
These potential tensions between the needs for environmental protection and 
economic development are visible in the Structure and Local plan statements 
on the re-use of redundant military sites in Lincolnshire.  The County 
Structure Plan notes that such sites have potential for housing development, 
and that central and local government policy endorses the maximum use of 
such land, warns that each case of re-use of these exceptional sites has to be 
considered on its own merits, and that development should ideally form part 
of ‘an overall sustainable mixed use development including co-ordinated 
infrastructure provision’ (Lincolnshire County Council, 1998, p.36).  There 
is a tension, though, between environmental protection and the re-use of 
derelict sites.  They may have potential for economic development, but their 
existence should not be regarded ‘as a reason in itself for a re-use for 
employment development’, and warns that: 
Lincolnshire already has a number of former RAF establishments, 
now in employment use, inappropriately sited and providing a 
poor quality built environment, the latter because it has not 
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proved economically viable to do anything more than a basic 
conversion.  (Lincolnshire County Council, 1998, p.36) 
 
The Structure Plan advocates the pursuit of proposals for development 
through the Local Plan process, and accordingly the Local Plans for two of 
Lincolnshire’s Districts, North Kesteven and West Lindsey, deal explicitly 
with this issue.  North Kesteven dedicated a section of its Local Plan to the 
issue of disused airfields, stating explicitly that it sees redundant sites as 
offering growth opportunities: 
In particular, the identification of development on the bases is a 
positive way to solve the problems posed by redundancy.  It is 
also considered that the re-utilisation meets many of the 
fundamental objectives of sustainable development.  The 
development of these sites also enables less suitable greenfield 
sites to be protected.  (North Kesteven District Council, 1996, 
p.77) 
 
Special Policy Areas for two airfields (Martin and Swinderby) were 
designated, setting out the types of development which would generally be 
approved in development briefs.  West Lindsey District Council now follow 
a similar approach, providing for both housing and economic development at 
Brookenby and Hemswell Cliff.  The need for a planning brief setting out a 
vision for the redevelopment of a site is now recognised in the guidelines for 
the joint working of the MoD and Government Regional Offices in the 
disposal of surplus MoD property (DETR, 1997).   
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The need for a planning brief was emphasised with reference to the case of 
Hemswell Cliff, an airbase which had closed in 1963.  Two interviewees 
spoke of the lack of an initial planning guidance in shaping development 
there with no co-ordination of the re-use of the site. It is certainly a strange 
place to visit, a mixture of antique traders, antique jobbers, car boot sales, a 
residential home for the elderly, small catering outlets and a small aircraft 
museum, nestling against large hangars now used for the storage of grain 
and BSE-infected cattle carcasses.  The Sunday antique market, thought to 
be one of the biggest in Europe, attracts large numbers of visitors, and herein 
lay the roots of a dilemma.  The site supported many small businesses and 
patently contributed to the economic health of the area.  The cost was 
sustainabilty, with large volume of traffic and congestion, air pollution and 
litter.  As with Brookenby, on two separate occasions local authority officers 
spoke of the need to avoid ‘another Hemswell’ in planning for the 
redevelopment of their redundant sites.   
 
The point was also made that a certain degree of flexibility is required in the 
formulation of planning briefs for a site.  In the words of one interviewee, 
‘planners can get a bit sniffy about these sites, which don’t conform to local 
plans’.  It was thought that exceptions have to be made at times, even if 
development does not strictly conform to ideas of sustainable development, 
because ‘if the local authority does not bend its own rules, nothing will 
happen on these sites’.   
 
Development briefs were thought by some to be crucial to a local planning 
authority in giving it a degree of influence over site disposal.  Contradictory 
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information was given on this, with some local authority officers talking of 
the powerlessness in shaping the disposal process, and others talking of the 
leverage they were able to apply, particularly in avoiding the fragmentation 
of sites.  Fragmentation had been recognised as a key cause of the 
unplanned, uncoordinated and unsustainable development which had 
followed the disposal of Hemswell. For example, a Development Brief was 
drawn up for RAF Swinderby ‘to have some sort of measure of persuasion 
of the MOD and the sale of the land’.  The Local Plan placed considerable 
emphasis on the need for a co-ordinated approach, stating that without this, 
several problems would inevitably arise, such as potential decay, dereliction 
and deterioration of an attractive environment; limited re-use of housing and 
employment areas without appropriate provision for shops and community 
services; and no investment in improved services or upgrading or access of 
lighting (North Kesteven District Council, 1996, p.80).  The District Council 
was concerned that if the site was sold to numerous purchasers, without a 
clear development brief, it would have a real struggle trying to get any co-
ordinated redevelopment to the site which in turn would be both 
environmentally unsustainable and visually intrusive.  Again, in interview, a 
local authority officer spoke of the lessons learnt from the experience at 
RAF Binbrook where, according to another interviewee, the lack of a 
development brief at the time of disposal had meant that no strategic vision 
had been developed of the area’s needs had been defined ‘and we’re still 
living with the consequences of that today’. 
 
This research detected considerable frustration at how the lack of a co-
ordinated development plan for certain sites had in some senses removed the 
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very great economic and social development potential offered by redundant 
sites for their areas and communities.  Considerable criticism was made in 
the past about the role of the MoD in the sale of bases, as outlined above.  
The lack of consultation had been a particular problem in the past.  A 
number of witnesses to the House of Commons Defence Committee raised 
the issue, with the Local Authority Associations voicing strong criticisms: 
There should be close links between local authorities and the 
MoD on issues relating to land use planning, in particular the 
allocation of land for development in local plans and structure 
plans, and on proposals for seeking planning permission for 
particular developments.  Close and regular liaison between local 
authorities and the MoD would benefit both parties and enable the 
local authorities to comment at an early stage on the suitability or 
otherwise of particular development proposals and consider all 
possible options for the use of sites in development plans.  
Because most local authorities are currently in the process of 
preparing or consulting on their development plans it is essential 
that liaison on land use issues takes place as soon as possible.   
Local authorities cannot give special treatment to the MoD as land 
owners but the Department should be more aware of the planning 
procedures.  There is solid evidence that the defence land 
authority is not familiar with structure plan and local plan 
procedures and is reluctant to take part in the consultation stages 
of these plans.  (HCDC, 1994b, p.147) 
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One interviewee in Wiltshire was quite concerned that after initial 
improvement in the early 1990s, the co-ordination of disposals with the local 
planning authority had deteriorated over the past couple of years.  Some 
might have lain with the establishment of new procedures and a new 
organisational strategy for disposals with the establishment of the Defence 
Estate Organisation, launched in March 1997.  The implementation of the 
1997 guidelines may be slowly improving matters.  This is another possible 
area for further research (see also Herd, forthcoming). 
 
The role of rural development policy and funding mechanisms 
In this section I assess the potential of rural development policy structures 
and funding mechanisms in facilitating the regeneration of bases and 
localities affected by conversion.  A number of policies exist, and intention 
here is to draw together their key features as they affect conversion, rather 
than attempt a more stringent policy evaluation. 
 
I start with European funding for rural development under Objective 5b 
Programme and funding for conversion under KONVER.  Objective 5b of 
the European Union’s Structural Funds targets rural economic development 
issues in spatially-defined areas.  Some 82 of these across the EU were 
granted Objective 5b status for the programming period 1994-99, and eleven 
of these are in the UK.  In some of these, conversion was important in 
framing the nature of the rural development problem set out in the Single 
Programme Document (SPD) produced for each Objective 5b area.  The 
SPD for the South West Region talks of the further decline in defence-
related employment as a major threat to the economic health of the region, 
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and notes the continuing dependence of some localities on defence-related 
employment despite significant reductions in employment in this sector 
during the 1980s. The SPD for Lincolnshire highlights the dependence of a 
number of major employers in the area on defence contracts and the 
vulnerability of the area as a whole to defence restructuring (GOEM, 1994).  
The SPD for East Anglia puts similar emphasis on the problems for 
economic development experienced as a result of base closure.  One of the 
four sub-areas designated for the receipt of Objective 5b funds, Central 
Rural Norfolk, was though to be particularly dependent with a high 
proportion of the population engaged in armed forces-related occupations—
9.1% of the workforce in 1991.  The existing and planned closure of four 
RAF bases in the Objective 5b area was anticipated to involved the loss of 
more than 1,500 jobs; jobs in the affected bases amounted to about 12% of 
the total employment in the area (GOER, 1994, p.15).  In East Anglia, two 
interviewees speculated that the designation of the Objective 5b area may 
have been the result of the expected impact of airbase closures (see Ward 
and Woodward, 1998, for further information on Objective 5b in East 
Anglia).   
 
Funding under Objective 5b is determined according to priorities and 
measures set out in the SPD enabling economic development, and is 
available on a matched basis.  This requires the establishment of partnerships 
between public, private and voluntary sector organisations.  The availability 
of Objective 5b funds has undoubtedly provided a significant opportunity for 
economic development in eligible areas, including conversion projects; the 
possibilities of funding for projects at Brookenby and Scampton had been 
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explored.  However, interviewees with experience of Objective 5b in East 
Anglia and Lincolnshire both expressed some concern that more use could 
have been made of this pot of money for conversion.  Private sector 
reluctance the initiate bids was thought to be the reason.  In one East 
Anglian district, it was felt that local authority’s capital resources were too 
limited to be able to initiate projects on old airfields, and the private sector 
was understandably reluctant to undertake development when such 
substantial investment was need in the basic infrastructure.  From this, we 
could conclude that the utility of Objective 5b for conversion is perhaps 
rather limited, given the natures of the sites concerned. 
 
The European Union provides funding for conversion projects under 
KONVER, a Community Initiative introduced in 1993 and extended under 
KONVER II to the end of 1997.  KONVER provides support for economic 
diversification in areas heavily dependent on the defence sector, through the 
conversion of economic activities to make areas less dependent on the 
defence sector, and through the encouragement of commercially viable 
activities in the defence industrial sector.  67 areas were designated in the 
UK and Gibraltar for the receipt of KONVER II funding for projects worth 
20.85 million ECU in the Eastern Region (which includes Mid Suffolk and 
Suffolk Coastal Districts in Suffolk) and 2.04 million ECU in the East 
Midlands (which includes North Kesteven and South Kesteven Districts in 
Lincolnshire) (DTI, 1997).  In the UK KONVER has mostly been used for 
schemes for the diversification of the defence industry (Hooper and Cox, 
1996; Brömmelhörster, 1997), but it is also available for base conversion. 
Funding under KONVER I had been used to undertake evaluation and 
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feasibility studies of the nature of the conversion problem in Suffolk and 
Norfolk.  Funding under KONVER II had been used for site redevelopment 
at RAF Bentwaters, and for evaluations at RAF Swinderby.  £108,000 had 
assisted Lincolnshire County Council in the development of Springfield 
business park under the measure for the rehabilitation of military sites and 
environmental improvements, £50,000 had been granted to North Kesteven 
District Council for activities to promote aviation heritage tourism and 
£62,000 had been granted to Lincolnshire TEC for re-training initiatives 
(GOEM, undated).  KONVER funds are not directed explicitly at rural 
development issues, but have nonetheless been a significant help to local 
authorities in defining rural development and conversion issues.   
 
National strategies for rural development include the Single Regeneration 
Budget (SRB)  and Rural Development Commission’s Rural Challenge 
competition.  The SRB was formed under a central government initiative to 
draw together disparate sources of economic regeneration funding, the 
distribution of which was to be placed in the hands of the newly-created 
Government Regional Offices.  As part of this process, many  ‘urban’ 
policies (i.e. policies designed for designated problems in urban areas) were 
‘de-urbanised’ in that possibilities now existed for more rural areas to bid for 
SRB funding (Oatley, 1998).   Single Regeneration Budget funds have been 
drawn down for the conversion of redundant lands and buildings at Catterick 
Garrison in North Yorkshire following competition in Round 4 of the SRB 
(a bid in 1996 to Round 3 was seen as a ‘marginal failure’).  The SRB bid 
was co-ordinated by a body called the Richmond Partnership, bringing 
together a range of private and public sector institutions and individuals with 
 48
an interest in the regeneration of Richmond and the Catterick Garrison 
parishes of Hispwell, Colburn and Scotton.  Funds of £1,067,175 were 
awarded over a four years period, with a further £6 million to be drawn in 
from public, private and European sources.  The projects to be financed 
include a new learning and childcare Centre of Excellence, a business park 
and a community health and recreation centre as capital projects.  Funding 
was sought but not granted for a number of additional revenue projects such 
as a skills training programme, an adventure project for young people, an 
employment guidance service, environmental improvements and an out-of-
school club).  The SRB offers an open invitation to localities to express their 
needs, defined on the basis of both deprivation and opportunity, and 
potentially offer a more flexible form of assistance; a number of SRB bids 
had been submitted for conversion projects in Lincolnshire.  One criticism of 
the scheme is that the funds have tended to be awarded to relatively affluent 
areas, places which might not necessarily have the most need, but possibly 
have greater economic power and the resources available to win within a 
competitive bidding framework.  Catterick has benefited from the SRB.  
Other equally (or more) needy areas may not.  An evaluation of the impact 
of the SRB on rural areas and on conversion projects may well be worth 
undertaking. 
 
The Rural Development Commission is the statutory body in England for the 
promotion of economic and social development in rural areas.  Various 
mechanisms exist within designated Rural Development Areas for economic 
generation.  Rural Challenge, a competitive scheme initiated in 1993 marked 
a significant departure for rural regeneration funding with its emphasis on 
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competition, partnership and the involvement of the private sector (Jones 
and Little, forthcoming).  It is considered here because a project for 
developments at Brookenby was a winner in Round 1 of Rural Challenge in 
1994.  Under Rural Challenge, projects bid for six prizes of up to £1 million, 
and at Brookenby this sum was match-funded bringing forward a scheme 
worth £2.5 million for the regeneration of this redundant air base.  The 
project included the redevelopment and marketing of the technical park, 
providing employment and attracting inward investment.  Improvements to 
infrastructure, roads and street lighting would be undertaken to enable 
adoption by the relevant authorities and open up development opportunities.  
A programme of environment improvements was to be carried out to 
upgrade and demilitarise the settlement.  Other elements of the project 
provided for a family resource centre, a village hall, a youth club and 
recreational facilities for the residents, the provision of vocational training 
and adult education and the establishment of a Development Trust for the 
village . 
 
Funding under Rural Challenge has undoubtedly brought many benefits to 
this new community with the provision of services and facilities for the 
residents and the creation of employment (over 60 jobs) on the technical 
park.  However, interviewees involved with the project pointed to a number 
of difficulties which illustrated both the problems associated with the 
conversion of military sites and the difficulties inherent in competitive, 
partnership based development strategies with such great reliance on the 
involvement of the private sector.  A major problem was felt to be a 
structural weakness in the original bid document.  This had been drawn up 
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on the basis of a community appraisal conducted in the early 1990s.  The 
origins of the bid in community needs was reflected in the objectives for the 
project, and these were felt to the projects’ major strengths.  However, the 
economic development element involving the upgrading and use of the 
buildings in the technical park was thought to have involved great 
difficulties possibly because the contribution of the private sector partner, a 
development company which had purchased the site from the MoD had not 
been realistically assessed.  The private sector partner, Sun Binbrook Ltd., 
was generally perceived to be uninterested in active participation in the 
project, to the frustration and bemusement of project workers (and I return to 
the issue of partnership below).  There were also complications under 
legislation on state aid to industry, limiting the investment of public money 
in the private sector, which compromised the use of Rural Challenge funds 
for the upgrading of the (privately owned) technical park.  Another problem 
was that, in all such projects, funding is drawn against defrayed expenditure; 
the projects have no cash flow.  This had implications for the ways in which 
development work could proceed.  It also caused frustrations within the 
community: 
... this idea of a million pounds coming to the village was very 
real to people and there was almost an expectation of a mile-high 
pile of pound notes.  And it was a difficult and disillusioning 
experience explaining how the government works and that it isn’t 
really like that, and a lot of expectations and illusions were 
cracked.’  (Interview with development worker, Lincolnshire, 
February 1998) 
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Many of the problems experienced at Brookenby were replicated in other 
Rural Challenge projects; the limitations to this scheme lie in its competitive 
nature, where competition rather than need determines funding, and where 
the active involvement of the private sector is so crucial (see Little et al, 
1998; Jones and Little, forthcoming).   
 
The partnership issue was also pertinent to all the Rural Challenge projects, 
and to current government thinking on rural development policy and funding 
more generally.  It is also extremely pertinent to economic and social 
regeneration of redundant military facilities.  Examples of failed and 
successful regeneration partnership strategies indicate how conversion might 
best succeed. 
 
The idea of partnerships in economic regeneration is now well-established in 
urban development policy, and the study of partnerships has generated a 
significant academic literature (see Oatley, 1998).  It is becoming central to 
both rural development and conversion strategies.  For example, the 1995 
Rural White Paper emphasises that the government welcomes ‘bids from 
local partnerships as a way of maximising the benefits of regeneration for 
local people’.  The 1996 report on the White Paper stresses this by 
illustrating its paragraph on the reuse of redundant MoD land with a picture 
of Dinton Business Park, which 
... opened in March 1996 on the site of RAF Chilmark in 
Wiltshire.  20 small business units have been provided by a 
partnership between the local authorities, the Rural Development 
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Commission and the European Union’s KONVER programme. 
(DoE, 1996, p. 43) 
 
This research came across a number of partnerships established to deal with 
the consequences of defence restructuring.  SDEP,  ‘The Economic 
Partnership for South and West Dorset’, was formed in response to concerns 
about the economic impact of the closure of Portland Naval Base and other 
local defence establishments.  Members include the local authority, the 
RDC, the local Chamber of Commerce, Dorset TEC, local businesses and 
the Trades Council.  Its main activities include the marketing of business and 
development opportunities, project handling for companies considering 
investing in the area, and lobbying to the EU and central government for 
funds under KONVER and the SRB.  The 1996 report commissioned by the 
RDC on the ‘rural peace dividend’ made an important point when it noted 
that partnerships like this have considerable value beyond the immediate 
issue of site closure and run-down (EAG/ECOTEC, 1996).   Another 
example is the Partnership for the Regeneration of the Catterick Garrison 
Communities, co-ordinated by the Richmond Partnership (and itself a 
partnership of public and private sector interests).  The Catterick 
Regeneration partnership was formed in order to help initiate a number of 
schemes and grant bids for the regeneration of the Richmond and the 
Catterick Garrison communities, culminating in the successful SRB bid 
outlined above.  A total of 19 organisations are members of this Partnership, 
including North Yorkshire County Council, North Yorkshire TEC, 
Richmond District Council, HQ 19th Mechanised Brigade and Catterick 
Garrison, Darlington College of Technology, North Yorkshire Health 
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Authority, Northallerton Health Trust, English Partnerships, Army Welfare 
Service and Fair Play for Kids and the local parish councils.   
 
The utility of partnerships in rural development varies, of course, according 
to their composition and synergy.  Partners need to have a shared vision of 
the possibilities of redevelopment.  The development brief for RAF 
Swinderby contains strong words about the necessity for private sector 
partners to share this vision: 
The authority has a clear vision of the site and the assurances 
which it would expect developers to establish to ensure that the 
vision is achieved, but it also recognises that the way forward is 
through partnership with the developers whose investment will be 
essential.  The Council is keen to establish a structure with 
prospective developers where both sides share a vision about what 
can be achieved, and the partnership is about getting things done 
in the best interests of those who will work and live at the site.  It 
may be that this could best be achieved through a joint venture 
structure with a developer or developers and the Council and 
possibly other public bodies.  The Council would welcome 
discussions about all types of partnership as long as it is clear that 
the Council will seek to ensure that its concerns are met.  (North 
Kesteven District Council, 1994, p.2) 
 
Problems can ensue when partners disagree about development proposals, 
and there were hints that this had happened at RAF Scampton.  Partners will 
not necessarily have the same interests, and this had caused problems at 
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Brookenby where different members of the development board were felt to 
have conflicting interest.  In the words of one interviewee, ‘how many 
people on the board can have the overview?’.  Partnerships can also be very 
unequal, again a problem at Brookenby.  ‘I missed a vital member of that 
partnership out’ said an interviewee describing the composition of the 
project partnership, ‘the private sector.  It is sometimes difficult to consider 
them as being a partner, but they are in theory supposed to be a partner’.  
Another interviewee thought the private sector partner uninterested in 
investing in the technical park properties which they owned: ‘ I think they 
just saw this as an opportunity to make some money’.  The problems 
associated with ‘paper’, ‘false’ or ‘opportunistic partnerships are elaborated 
on elsewhere (Little et al, 1998; Jones and Little, forthcoming; Painter, 
1998).  Whatever the problems, they are likely to remain part of the 
redevelopment landscape for the time being. 
 
If partnership is a common issue for rural development, whether or not is it 
associated with conversion, other issues emphasise the specificity of 
conversion as a rural development problem  Military bases are unlike other 
sites because of what they contain, the problems associated with their 
infrastructure, the issue of contamination and the institutional frameworks in 
which they sit.  The military inheritance is a peculiar one and offers peculiar 
challenges to rural development strategies.  These sites represent significant 
public investment, yet there are clear limits to the ability of the public sector 
to invest in them because of lack of resources.  These sites are potentially 
highly attractive to private investors, but the private sector needs to be 
encouraged to show interest.   
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These factors were recognised by Network Demilitarised, established as a 
European network of defence-dependent regions under RECITE, a European 
Community Initiative, in 1993.  One of the Working Groups, devoted 
explicitly to the issues surrounding base conversion, was chaired by a 
representative from Wiltshire County Council.  Following investigation of 
base conversion issues experienced in different member states, Network 
Demilitarised developed a Commercial Audit Procedure (CAP) methodology 
to assess the best commercial uses of surplus land, buildings, specialised 
military facilities and infrastructure (Network Demilitarised, 1994).  The 
CAP was developed by drawing on the experiences of sites which had 
already undergone conversion, and has been presented as a tried-and-tested 
method for enabling conversion, either through suggestion of appropriate 
methods for determining re-use, and through identification of the likely 
problems that can hamper the optimal re-use of sites.  The CAP essentially 
consists of four steps; first, a review of the site and its special characteristic 
in order to develop alternative development options; second, the testing of 
these options using a range of variables; third, a comparison of the options 
which survive the testing state; and fourth, detailed feasibility studies and 
implementation of the preferred scheme (Network Demilitarised, 1994, p.3).  
The emphasis throughout is on the need for Working Groups as a means of 
creating partnerships which have a real interest in the conversion of the base, 
possibly the most significant step along the conversion path.  Other critical 
issues include the need to establish ownership, the need for certainty from 
the relevant defence ministry as to the future of the site, the need for 
community involvement in the formulation of development plans and the 
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need to take account of existing planning policies and development 
frameworks (Network Demilitarised, 1996).   
 
The CAP methodology was piloted at RAF Chilmark in Wiltshire, the 
conversion of which into Dinton Business Park has already been mentioned 
to illustrate the types of partnerships possible in site redevelopment.  The 
site was bought from the Ministry of Defence by Wiltshire County Council.  
This is perhaps unusual, but as a representative of the County Council 
commented, no private developer would have touched the site, given the 
infrastructure that needed to be installed to bring the site up to standard.  A 
good economic development case could be made to persuade Council 
members to endorse the purchase, and a funding package was put together 
using local authority and Rural Development Programme funds to lever in a 
substantial amount of KONVER funding to carry out infrastructure 
improvements.  It is now a small but viable business park making an 
important contribution to the local economy.  It is also used as an example of 
the possibilities offered by the Commercial Audit Procedure. 
 
An Economic Development Conveyance model developed for the 
regeneration of RAF Scampton drew explicitly on the methodology of the 
CAP and again is underpinned by the notion of partnership.  This ambitious 
scheme drew on a model for base conversion introduced in the United States 
in 1993, under the Clinton Administration.  Again, the emphasis is on 
partnership in the preparation of development options, as well as their 
execution; a Working Group would be established to launch the Commercial 
Audit and define a set of goals and objectives for the reuse of the site, 
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informed by a comprehensive survey of the base and its facilities.  But it 
goes one stage further.  An outline of the Economic Development 
Conveyance model’s potential for RAF Scampton was given in 
documentation to support a bid for Regional Challenge funding.  Its key 
component would be the transfer of the base assets to a base redevelopment 
company (Investors in Scampton) so that the assets could be used as 
collateral to raise money for the redevelopment process.  This is an 
interesting scheme; time limits on the research, and space here, preclude 
comprehensive discussion.  However, the EDC model at Scampton faced a 
key problem (leaving aside the question of the uncertainty over the future of 
the site).  Treasury rules on the disposal of sites require sale to the highest 
bidder in order to maximise receipts, and within a three year period of being 
identified as surplus (the subject of critical comment by the House of 
Commons Defence Committee in 1994).  Ministerial approval would have to 
be sought to allow the transfer of assets under a concessionary sale.  In fact, 
the plans for RAF Scampton are (at time of writing) still on hold, but 
consideration of the site is included here as it raises a larger theoretical 
problem.  This concerns the tensions thrown up between central and local 
state by the whole conversion process.  I return to this point in the 
concluding section of this report.   
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PART III FUTURE QUESTIONS 
 
In this final section, I draw together some of the questions raised by this 
study of the impact of conversion on rural areas.  I look at conceptual and 
policy issues, and suggest areas for further research. 
 
 
Conceptual issues 
As this report has shown, the restructuring of the defence estate and 
conversion of military sites raises both opportunities and problems for the 
areas affected.  Whilst at a national level base conversions may not have 
warranted much critical attention, at the local level the issue is visible and 
important.  Base conversion is also important because of the conceptual 
issues it raises.  There are a number of these, but I limit discussion here to 
the two most pertinent that appeared during the course of this research.  
These are the conceptualisation of the conversion process as part of a ‘peace 
dividend’, and the issues conversion raises for relations between the central 
and local state. 
 
The discourse of a ‘peace dividend’ has proved a popular one in 
explanations of the factors which have led to the restructuring of the defence 
estate.  The term acquired currency in media debates following the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, the revolutions in many East European nation states and 
the fall of the Berlin Wall.  A peace dividend was anticipated; geopolitical 
changes would result in the slashing of the military budgets of NATO 
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members and the release of public money for investment in social welfare 
projects in the fields of health, welfare and housing.   
 
There have undoubtedly been changes in the structure of the defence 
capabilities of many nation states as a result of these geopolitical changes.  
In Britain, a programme of change initiated with the Options for Change 
review has seemingly dominated the lives of managers within the services 
and the Ministry of Defence.  This process continues as I write, with changes 
anticipated as a result of the Strategic Defence Review initiated in 1997 by 
the new Labour Government, and expected in final form in July 1998.  
Questions remain, however, as to whether the idea of a peace dividend is 
appropriate for understanding such changes. 
 
The notion of a peace dividend is certainly an intuitively attractive one, 
particularly for those at local authority level dealing with the ramifications 
of base closure.  It has provided a convenient explanatory hook onto which 
discussions of conversion can be hung.  For example, the Rural 
Development Commission’s study of the effect of military restructuring in 
rural areas (EAG/ECOTEC, 1996) places the discussion squarely within the 
framework of a peace dividend in its introductory paragraph: 
[...] three waves of [defence] rationalisation and expenditure have 
resulted, and are still resulting, in the close and down-sizing of a 
large number of military bases and the restructuring or sell-off of 
a variety of companies previously  working as contractors to the 
MOD.  While in aggregate the benefits to the UK economy 
through saved public expenditure are substantial—the “Peace 
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Dividend”—the specific employment and income implications of 
these cuts for certain regions and sectors are substantially 
negative.  It is the size and distribution of this “Peace Penalty” 
that forms the backdrop to the present report.  (EAG/ECOTEC, 
1996, p.1) 
 
Briefings prepared by the founding members of the Scampton Partnership to 
try and access funding for the redevelopment of RAF Scampton draw on the 
same discourse.  In response to the then Prime Minister’s expressed interest 
in the issue following a visit to Lincoln, Lincolnshire TEC produced a 
briefing document entitled Beating Swords into Ploughshares: 
We hope that [our proposals] find favour with Government so that 
together we can demonstrate how the problems of military base 
closures can be turned into opportunities for the whole community, 
and the ‘Peace Dividend’ can become the reality envisaged by 
those who took the bold steps to reduce military expenditure, in 
response to the new world order and the establishment of a safer 
world for this and tomorrow’s generations.  (Lincolnshire TEC, 
1994, p.2) 
 
The notion of a peace dividend has probably served most use as a means of 
getting the issue of base conversion onto the public agenda.  However, there 
are two main difficulties in using it as an explanatory framework for 
understanding the conversion process.  The first, as Oakey (1991) noted with 
reference to the defence industry, is that given the free-market principles 
espoused by the then US and UK governments, there were fundamental 
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legislative obstacles as well as major ideological dilemmas involved.  The 
massive savings anticipated at the time in defence expenditure could not 
easily be ploughed back into the economy.  The difficulties experienced at 
Brookenby are a case in point, with the limits imposed on public sector 
investment in privately-owned companies.  The second difficulty with the 
use of the idea of a peace dividend as an explanatory framework is hinted at 
the quotation from the Lincolnshire TEC, above.  For some commentators, 
the end of the Cold War and the establishment of George Bush’s much 
heralded New World Order have merely changed the rhetoric behind a 
continued process of global economic and political dominance by the United 
States, with the support of the UK (Chomsky, 1992; Wood, 1998).  As John 
Lovering has argued, the idea of a peace dividend is fundamentally flawed in 
both political and economic terms (Lovering, 1994).   
 
If there are objections to the notion of the peace dividend as an explanatory 
framework for defence estate restructuring, what alternatives exist?  With 
reference to the experiences in the United States of base closure, where the 
largest wave of closures occurred between 1961 and 1977, Barney Warf 
argues that the long history of base closures suggests that 
[...] the geography of military facilities should be conceptualized 
as a palimpsest, as multiple layers of base openings and closures 
reflecting the accumulation of strategic locational decisions over 
time under varying budgetary, political and strategic 
circumstances (Warf, 1997, p.544) 
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This idea draws our attention away from the idea of base closures as a purely 
contemporary issue; as the House of Commons Defence Committee noted, 
interest in the defence estate is currently unusually high, but few of the 
issues raised to the Committee were felt to be new (HCDC, 1994a, p.vi).  
The issue of base closures, rather, is perhaps best approached via a focus on 
the interactions between local and global political and economic processes, 
which contribute to the restructuring of defence capabilities as much as to 
rural economic and social change.  As this report has shown, the some of the 
consequences of base closure (such as locational, planning and rural 
development policy issues) may often best be understood as issues arising 
out of the geography of uneven development, rather than as a peace penalty 
or dividend. 
 
A second conceptual issue appearing in this research concerns the questions 
which the redevelopment of former military sites raises for the relations 
between the central and local state.  This research found evidence for 
conflicts between central and local government over conversion issues, for 
example, over flows of information about prospective base closures.  Barney 
Warf, citing the contests in the USA between the national state (Congress, 
the Pentagon, the presidency) and the local state (county and municipal 
government, local interest groups) over military facilitates, notes how 
‘military base closures illuminate a fascinating contradiction between 
different levels of the state’ (Warf, 1997, p.544).  There are obviously clear 
contrasts between the experience of the US and Britain, not least in the 
institutional framework and timescale in which conversion takes place.  As 
numerous commentators on urban and regional policy have noted, however, 
 63
institutional differences do not obscure wider similarities between the US 
and Britain in terms of the insights that can be drawn from theories of state 
and governance, and this is clearly an area for further theoretical work.  Two 
examples from this research indicate the issues further conceptual work 
might take up.  The first comes from a seemingly throw-away remark made 
by one interviewee in Lincolnshire, commenting on the reasons for the 
failure of the Scampton Partnership’s bid for Regional Challenge finance.  
The bid failed because government money would not be spent on cleaning 
up the mess made by another government policy.  So how are the interests of 
different departments in central government reconciled?  Are there merely 
procedural blocks at work, or more fundamental divisions over policy 
development at the central level?  A second off-the-cuff comment from a 
second interviewee raises a further issue here: military bases represent 
massive investment of public funds and are a public asset, yet the public 
sector at the local level is usually unable (because of a lack of resources) to 
invest in these sites in order to enable their re-use.  How can contradictions 
between the central and local state best be overcome?  Is this an issue for 
policy or, as Warf comments, indicative of a more profound set of tensions 
between the central and local state?  This is clearly an area for further 
theoretically-driven research.   
 
Policy issues 
Although this research did not set out explicitly to evaluate rural 
development policies dealing with base conversions, the study of conversion 
in rural areas in Britain automatically entails a consideration of rural 
development policy.  A range of policy mechanisms and funding strategies 
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exist to encourage various forms of economic and social regeneration or 
development on former military sites.  This research points to two related 
issues which could inform policy debates and policy development in the 
future, concerning the specificity of base conversion, and the 
institutionalisation of base conversion within policy mechanisms.   
 
As I outlined in the introduction, one of the questions underpinning the 
empirical phase of this research was whether there was anything peculiar 
about former military sites that made them somehow different in rural policy 
terms from, for example, former coalfield areas or places suffering from 
agricultural decline.  This question could be extended to inquire as to 
whether there is any difference in former military sites, relative to any other 
part of the British countryside undergoing social and economic upheavals as 
a result of wider processes of social and economic change.  As one might 
anticipate, the answer to this is both no and yes.  In some aspects, the 
problems raised by the closure of military sites, and their redevelopment, are 
nothing special.  Economic decline can be expected, but economic 
development can be encouraged through policy mechanisms.  Social change 
will ensue, and this may be both positive and negative.  Land use planning 
issues have to be resolved, often creatively.  Development partnerships have 
to be formed, which experience the same problems and benefits across the 
country.   
 
But there are peculiarities to military sites.  They often have contamination 
problems.  They are often very large sites.  Many sites contain highly 
specialised structures that are not easy to convert.  As the Brookenby Project 
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Officer put it, “The blast-proof structures turned seemingly simple 
alterations into major feats of engineering and ingenuity” (RDC, 1996, p.2).  
There may be on-going security issues on sites (see also Network 
Demilitarised 1994).  Although recognition of the specificity of the 
conversion problem is discernible at a European level, with the KONVER 
initiative, there is less evidence of this closer to home.  Rural development 
policy mechanisms and funding strategies have been used for conversion, to 
varying degrees of success, but there is no specific funding for conversion at 
a national level.  Guidance on the conversion process comes only from 
statements in response to other topics (for example, the Rural White Paper), 
and in the form of guidelines for the joint working of the MoD and 
Government Regional Offices on the disposal of surplus MoD property 
(DETR, 1997).   
 
The lack of explicit policy directed towards conversion wouldn’t necessarily 
be problematic were it not for a second point. As a number of interviewees 
pointed out, and as the Network Demilitarised and Scampton Partnership’s 
respective advocacy of a Commercial Audit Procedure and an Economic 
Development Conveyance indicated, so much more could be achieved for 
rural areas in terms of facilitating economic and social development if 
specific policy measures, targeted at conversion, were in place.  All the 
interviewees involved in this issue, without exception, expressed 
exasperation at the difficulties inherent in conversion because of the 
contradictions between the different policy areas that impinge on this issue.  
Comparisons were most frequently drawn with the US experience where 
greater institutionalisation of the base closure process (through the BRAC 
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Commission) and a number of initiatives since 1993 had made the 
conversion process more locally accountable, faster and more efficient.  Of 
course, the grass is always greener on the other side of the fence, and no 
doubt their American counterparts would have similar grumbles.  The point 
however is that this research showed a need for a greater degree of 
integration between different policy areas in order to facilitate conversion of 
defence sites.  This is perhaps within the remit of the new Regional 
Development Agencies, although documentation outlining the shape of the 
new RDAs makes no mention of defence conversion as a regional 
development issue.  Another suggestion put forward by the Arms 
Conversion Project  suggests that the proposed Defence Diversification 
Agency, plans for which were published in March 1988, be granted 
responsibility for base conversion (ACP, 1998; MoD, 1998).  This research 
appears to confirm the need for specific, conversion-orientated development 
policy.   
 
Research issues 
A preliminary investigation of this kind inevitably leads to conclusions that 
further research is needed.  The conceptual and policy issues to which 
further empirical research might make a contribution have been outlined 
above.   There appears to be a lack of published and available information in 
the following areas: 
 
First, a systemic survey and classification of defense estate lands undergoing 
conversion would be useful, in order to assess the types of sites disposed of, 
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the re-use (recycling?) of sites by the MoD and the mechanisms used in 
disposal. 
 
Second, there has been virtually no research undertaken on the social 
consequences of base closure, on, for example, housing and welfare service 
provision.  Nor has there been any exploration of cultural issues arising from 
conversion. 
 
Third, given their importance in the conversion process, it would appear that 
research into the role of developers in the purchase, management and 
physical development of sites is long overdue.   
 
Fourth, the use of rural development policy and funding mechanisms could 
be more closely evaluated, rather than just described as I have done here.  
Such research is pressing given the establishment of new Regional 
Development Agencies and their expected pivotal role in shaping the 
development trajectories of regions affected by base closure. 
 
Fifth, there appears to be scope for research evaluating the operation of 
mechanisms within the MoD for managing the disposal of surplus property 
(although there are indications that the Department of Environment may 
have initiated such research in 1997). 
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